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Abstract The moot point of the Western philosophical rhetoric about free will
consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative
actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism.
Philosophers who think that reconciliation between the two is possible are known as
metaphysical compatibilists. However, there are philosophers populating the other
end of the spectrum, known as the metaphysical libertarians, who maintain that claim
to intentional agency cannot be sustained unless it is assumed that indeterministic
causal processes pervade the action-implementation apparatus employed by the agent.
The metaphysical libertarians differ among themselves on the question of whether the
indeterministic causal relation exists between the series of intentional states and
processes, both conscious and unconscious, and the action, making claim for what has
come to be known as the event-causal view, or between the agent and the action,
arguing that a sort of agent causation is at work. In this paper, I have tried to propose
that certain features of both event-causal and agent-causal libertarian views need to be
combined in order to provide a more defendable compatibilist account accommo-
dating deliberative actions with deterministic causation. The ‘‘agent-executed-event-
causal libertarianism’’, the account of agency I have tried to develop here, integrates
certain plausible features of the two competing accounts of libertarianism turning
them into a consistent whole. I hope to show in the process that the integration of these
two variants of libertarianism does not challenge what some accounts of metaphysical
compatibilism propose—that there exists a broader deterministic relation between the
web of mental and extra-mental components constituting the agent’s dispositional
system—the agent’s beliefs, desires, short-term and long-term goals based on them,
the acquired social, cultural and religious beliefs, the general and immediate and
situational environment in which the agent is placed, etc. on the one hand and the
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decisions she makes over her lifetime on the basis of these factors. While in the
‘‘Introduction’’ the philosophically assumed anomaly between deterministic causa-
tion and the intentional act of deciding has been briefly surveyed, the second section is
devoted to the task of bridging the gap between compatibilism and libertarianism. The
next section of the paper turns to an analysis of folk-psychological concepts and
intuitions about the effects of neurochemical processes and prior mental events on the
freedom of making choices. How philosophical insights can be beneficially informed
by taking into consideration folk-psychological intuitions has also been discussed,
thus setting up the background for such analysis. It has been suggested in the end that
support for the proposed theory of intentional agency can be found in the folk-psy-
chological intuitions, when they are taken in the right perspective.
Keywords Agent-executed-event-causal libertarianism  Conditional analysis 
Event-causal libertarianism  Indeterministic causation  Intentional agency 
Executive self  Free will  Neurobiological determinism  Primitive agent-causal
libertarianism  Unconditional analysis
Introduction
Deterministic causation is understood to be a one-way, linear causal principle,
according to which, from the existing physical laws of the universe in force and the
states of affairs obtaining in the past only a certain sort of outcome is supposed to
logically follow. As Peter van Inwagen puts it:
Determinism, […] is the thesis that the past and the laws of nature jointly
determine a unique one among the possible or internally consistent futures to
be the future, the actual future. (Van Inwagen 1983)
Now it is the perennial concern of the philosophical community that what if the
series of events beginning from the deliberative processes through the evaluation of
alternative action plans to the implementation of the action1 is fundamentally
deterministic? Libertarians who unlike compatibilists believe that free will can only
be established on the falsity of determinism argue that the claim of rational agency2
is essentially a claim involving the truth of indeterminism existing at the micro-
level, constituted by neurochemical processes, of the intentional agent’s biological
architecture. If the causal sequences at this level turn out to be deterministic, it
would then undermine the agent’s ability to even contemplate a different action plan
than what she actually did.3 John Searle illuminatingly illustrates this
1 By the term action here is meant not merely an overt bodily action, but also a mental act such as a
decision made. Alfred Mele also suggests that mental events with a specified causal history having
pertinent causally efficacious (effortful) mental items merit the characterization as actions. See Mele
(1997, pp. 231–232 and p. 235).
2 A rational agent is one whose actions are not just endogenous, but is caused by mental events controlled
by her. In this sense, a kleptomaniac or a person suffering from alien hand syndrome is not to be
considered agents. See also Rigato (2015, pp. 110–111).
3 The alternate ability condition is considered as one of the hallmarks of rational agency. See Kane
(2005, p. 5).
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incompatibility between neurobiological determinism and the rational decision-
making process by citing a paradigmatic example of the decision-making activity—
the judgment of Paris of Troy in Greek mythology. Paris had to decide who of the
three goddesses, Aphrodite, Athena and Hera, he should give away the golden apple
in exchange for three equally inviting material possessions. Now if the
neurochemical processes in his brain from time t1, when he started the deliberation,
through t2, t3 and t4, when he weighed the advantages he would gain from each of
the offers the three goddesses made him, were causally sufficient for the decision he
made at t5, then, as Searle apprehends, scanty explanation is left for the
indecisiveness experienced by Paris and the rational inputs supplied by him to
resolve his inner conflict (Searle 2000). Using another illustration, Searle suggests
that if our everyday judgment of choosing one thing over another, say choosing
Burgundy over Bordeaux where there must be a transition from the process of
comparing and weighing conflicting reasons (say, at instant t1) to the final act of
settling on one alternative (say, at instant t2), the judgment would not count as an
act of free will if it is empirically proven that the transitional phase—the gap
between deliberations and decision—was executed by linear neurophysiological
brain processes corresponding to the mental processes, causally sufficient to
generate the decision, without further inputs in the brain (Searle 2001). In short, the
truth of one-way neurochemical determinism does not apparently allow an
explanatory room for Paris-like wavering over alternative action plans each of
which has equiprobability of being decided upon by the agent and the agent’s
stochastic final selection of any one of them. Libertarians, who believe that
deterministic causation is not the kind of causal process undergone by the agent
during volitional exercise (vide Fig. 1), here enter the scene and propose that
without the presupposition of indeterministic causal processes at the psychological
level, free will would be left unintelligible. Libertarians fundamentally argue that
deterministic causation which is a one-way causation cannot enable the process of
choice-making (vide Table 1). In their view, indeterministic processes occurring in
the gap between the agent’s thinking about making a certain decision and the
decision the agent finally settles for capture the real nature of agency; neurode-
terminism cannot then be true. In the following section, the question of how this
kind of causation not amounting to randomness provides a better explanation for
agential control would be taken up and a comparison in this connection would be
made between the two competing variants of libertarianism—the agent-causal
account and the event-causal account. However, it would also be suggested that the
most cogent account of libertarianism need not explain away determinism.
Agent-Grounded Indeterminacies or Agent-Involving-Event-Grounded
Indeterminacies?
Agent-causal libertarian accounts hold that (1) determinism inhibits free will
(incompatibilism), (2) agents naturally possess free will (libertarianism as opposed
to hard determinism) and (3) an agent is armed with the ability to do otherwise
absolutely independent of any change in the laws of nature or past conditions
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including the sub-agential causal conditions such as desires, beliefs and intentions.
Turner and Nahmias give a description of the agent-causal account thus:
agent-causal libertarians argue that for agents to act freely they must
participate in a special sort of relation, agent-causation, which holds between
a substance (the agent) and an event (the action) and which is not further
                  No                                                          Yes 
Incompatibilism Comapatibilism 
Libertarianism                                                                 Hard-determinism   
(Agents can only indeterministically                           (Agents are fixed to do what they do) 
do otherwise than what they do)       
Non-causal/ Simple indeterministic                          Causal indeterministic account of 
        account of agency                                                                   agency 
                                                                         Agent-causal view                                Event-causal view 
Fig. 1 Debate over the type of causal processes underlying agential control: deterministic causation vs.
indeterministic causation
Table 1 Different viewpoints adopted in response to the question of the possibility of free will in terms
of determinism
Determinism Indeterminism
Compatibilism/soft-
determinism
Free will (yes)
Incompatibilism Free will (no) Free will (yes)
Hard determinism/hard incompatibilism and
libertarianism
Libertarianism
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reducible to a causal relation that holds between mental states of the agent and
the action. Furthermore, if an agent S freely performs an action A, the agent-
causal relation that holds between S and A must be such that S could have done
other than A. (Turner and Nahmias 2006)
In a more recent development of agent-causal libertarianism, sketched by Richard
Swinburne, it has been argued that when we set a goal before us, such as passing the
semester examination with good grades, we perform intentional actions immedi-
ately subservient to this goal, say, reading reference books, taking notes, hearing
audio files of class lectures, etc. We, however, also perform yet more basic
intentional actions that help us perform the above actions, such as getting up early in
the morning, walking fast so as to grab the front row in the lecture theatre and
borrowing important reference materials from the library before others could do, for
which, as Swinburne argues, the agent has no ‘‘recipe’’. Performing this latter class
of intentional actions, called ‘‘instrumentally basic actions’’ by Swinburne, does not
consist in any event gap between the agent and these actions; the agent could not
have carried them out if they thought even their basic tryings were not causally
sufficient to produce the desired outcome—they would have then ceased to try and
hence ceased to act (Swinburne 2013, p. 134). Then an agent ‘‘trying to do an
instrumentally basic action… does not consist in the agent performing any other
intentional action, that is bringing about some intermediate state of affairs…
intentionally exercising causal influence’’ (op. cit., p. 135).
An agent-causal libertarian account of free will therefore rests on an uncondi-
tional analysis of the Ability for Alternate Action Condition of free will—
henceforth to be referred to as the A3 principle. An unconditional analysis of an
intentional act permits the following:
An agent s could have done*A instead of A even if nothing changes prior to s’s
A-ing. The ‘‘nothing’’ in the statement includes not just the laws of nature but also
the mental states of the agent until the moment of making the choice, emphasizing
that no other factors, not even the sub-agential events like the agent’s beliefs,
desires, etc. need to change. As explicated by Randolph Clarke:
… when an agent acts with free will, her action is not causally determined by
any prior events. The agent herself was said to cause her action, and this
causation by the agent was said not to consist in causation by an event or
collection of events…. what the agent did was not an accident or a matter of
chance; the agent herself made it happen that she did what she did. She was an
uncaused cause of her so acting. (Clarke 1993)
I propose here that the agent-causal thesis sketched above is a primitive and
rather underdeveloped way of committing to agential control, and stands in need
of a revision. Unless that is done, the unconditional analysis of free will that lies
at the heart of agent-causal account of libertarianism will be prone to error. The
biggest disadvantage with this form of agent-causal libertarianism is not that it
puts an ‘‘unmoved mover’’—an ontologically irreducible entity—at the begin-
ning of a causal chain leading to the intentional output. Its biggest demerit is it
does not at all admit a causal chain leading from the agent to the action
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implementation; instead it looks at the agent as a stand-alone system by itself,
needing no further cognitive resources. However, this implies a denial of micro-
indeterministic causation involving interplay between agent-involving mental
events such as beliefs, desires, intentions and ratiocinations, which is also
assumed as a key component of rational judgment. Eighteenth century Scottish
philosopher Thomas Reid’s agent-causal account which is still cited as one of
the first of these archetypal agent-contingent libertarian views has been charged
with this objection. Although Reid’s view satisfactorily shows why indetermin-
ism at the micro-level is required for ‘‘the determination of will’’, his insistence
that by definition an agent is the one that exerts direct active power to cause a
volition producing elements that may subsequently result in the action, without
any other causal relation coming in between the agent’s direct exertion of power
and the occurrence of volition, leaves it vulnerable to teething questions about
the nature of causation and of the agent it tries to endorse. Reid simply cannot
think beyond any other efficient cause than the self exerting action-producing or
action-vetoing power. As he puts it:
In the strict and proper sense, I take an efficient cause [of some event] to be a
being who had power to produce the effect, and exerted that power for that
purpose…. Power to produce an effect, supposes power not to produce it….
(Reid 1895)
Now this form of the agent-causal view can be contrasted with the event-causal
account of libertarianism. An event-causal account makes the A3 principle feasible
by holding that agent-centric events (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.) measured by
the agent before taking action, indeterministically cause the action. So while agent-
causal accounts require unconditional analysis of the A3 principle, event-causal
accounts require a conditional analysis. According to the conditional analysis: An
agent s could have done *A instead of A only if some prior event relevant to the
occurrence of an alternate action or choice changes. The conditional analysis of an
intentional act emphasizes that in order for A to be done by an agent s, s must
necessarily have p and if s does *A, then s must necessarily have *p. However,
neither s’s having p nor*p is fixed or predetermined prior to the occurrence of A or
*A. This being so, the event-causal account unlike the primitive agent-causal view
allows the following corollaries:
1. An agent s is left with all the leeway to choose from among the mental events
(denoted by p or*p)—beliefs, desires, thoughts and ratiocinations pertinent to
the multiple choices weighed—processed by the agent—so as to be able to
generate a certain A (or *A). Any change in p (or *p) would produce a
different outcome other than A (or *A). This implies that a deterministic
relation between the series of agent-involving and agent-controlled mental
events as causes and the actual decision is supposed to be a requirement for
agential control. The event-causal claim is thus in tandem with psychological
determinism.
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Let us suppose s has the deliberative process involving these sub-agential events
to wind up between time series t1 and t4. The outcome in the form of the decision
occurs at time t5. Now the leeway s enjoys to choose from among p1, p2, p3, etc.
between t1 and t4, leading to the final decision underscores the presence of
indeterministic processes at the agent’s micro-level or at the ‘‘local level’’, the term
I would adopt here, constitutionally giving shape to the entire intentional event
experienced by the agent from weighing alternatives to reaching the evaluative
judgment. What I intend to mean by the use of the term ‘‘local-level’’ processes, in
the context of an agent’s individualistic intentional actions, are indeterministic
processes that reflect how the agent is psychologically capable of rationally
reflecting on and assessing the pros and cons of all of her alternative choices and
respective sub-agential events underlying and underpinning each of those choices
even at the penultimate moment of making the choice.4 This enables the agent to
make a rational choice by fixing or vetoing not just the sub-agential events but also
more base-level neural processes. The local-level processes underlying intentional
acts thus uphold the truth of libertarianism. However, a closer examination would
also show that all the indeterministic play involving the agent’s selection of beliefs,
desires, inclinations, motives and past experiences that help in the formation of a
decision operates within a broader causal framework which is at bottom
deterministic. A global process, as contrasted from the local-level processes,
underlines the deterministic link between the nature of the mental events undergone
and processed by the agent and the nature of choice made accordingly, not just in
individual situations, but throughout s’s lifetime. The event-causal account of the
kind proposed here then has the explanatory advantage over the primitive agent-
causal view insofar as it irons out divergence between compatibilism and
libertarianism.
2. There clearly is a distinction between the agent and her deliberative resources,
i.e. the mental events that are in tandem with her action tendencies she
undergoes. Both, however, are causally relevant for the occurrence of her
intentional behaviour.
The event-causal view sketched above shows an integrative approach as it does
not leave out the role of the agent. By the term agent here should be understood an
executive entity in control over the preconscious and conscious mental events
relevant to some contemplated behaviour and their micro-level, i.e. neurobiological
constituents, propelling or vetoing them. In order to distinguish it from the simple
form of event-causal libertarianism, I would henceforth refer to this view as the
4 Explanatory advantage (2) of the event-causal view sketched here sits well with the account of free will
propounded by a number of leading classical Western and Indian philosophers that actions involving a
utilitarian kind of rational assessment are the epitome of free actions (see Kevin 2015 for a description of
the Faculties Model of the Will advanced by Aquinas and Descartes; Adam and Tannery 1973, pp. 57–58;
Maitra 1963, p. 35 for the Nya¯ya view of what a volition consists in). Assessment of choices involving
rational deliberation over which of the choices open to the agent would maximize the beneficial results
and minimize undesirable consequences before clinching the final decision requires high level of control.
And only local-level indeterministic processes during this period of rational assessment can equip an
agent with this kind of control.
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‘‘agent-executed-event-causal libertarianism’’. This variety of libertarianism has
been proposed in different forms by noted philosophers.5 Let us in particular cite the
event-causal account developed by Alfred Mele who has successfully worked out
this reconciliatory suggestion. When someone decides to do A, and implements the
decision to do A, the causal chain leading to the act looks like the following
diagram (vide Fig. 2) if Mele’s account is pictorially interpreted (Mele 2002):
Now Mele points out that when we claim that we could have done otherwise than
what we did in a given situation, the truth of this claim (i.e. the truth of the A3
principle) rests on an indeterministic causal relation between our rational
deliberative process and our evaluative judgment as an outcome of this process
(indicated sic by the dotted arrow in Fig. 2). According to Mele, the rational
deliberative process preceding a decision or a choice involves weighing the pros and
cons of various alternative actions that means sweeping through and assessing a
nebulous mix of beliefs, desires, hypotheses, etc. On Mele’s view the indetermin-
istic leap from this rational deliberative process to the evaluative judgment rests on
the presupposition that any of the beliefs (b1…bn), desires (d1…dn), hypotheses
(h1…hn) may ‘‘come to mind’’, i.e. lifted from their unconscious6 (offline, passive)
mode of existence to the conscious (online, occurrent) mode of existence. It remains
undetermined which of these beliefs, desires, hypotheses, etc. will figure in the
agent’s rational deliberative process as worthy of consideration and will ultimately
be taken up by the agent to make the evaluative judgment. Technically speaking,
Mele would suggest that indeterministic causal relation holds between rational
deliberation and evaluative judgment insofar as there are no conditions to
nomologically cause the mobility of particular beliefs, desires, etc. from their
unconscious or inactive mode to the active, conscious mode (see Fig. 3). The
evaluative judgment on the other hand is made when a particular action path is
selected from among the various alternative actions considered when the agent’s
mind was in the rational deliberative mode. Note that while the primitive agent-
causal libertarian theories downplay the causal role of sub-agential events or
components like individual beliefs–desires–opinions–hypotheses, etc., which we
have earlier referred to as constituting the agent’s dispositional system determining
the agent’s ability for alternate action, the agent-executed-event-causal libertarian
theories offer a credible picture of how agent-specific intentional and dispositional
states play a necessary causal role in making A3 a reality. Perhaps the primitive
agent-causal libertarians think that by positing the agent as an autonomous
5 See for instance Clarke’s ‘‘integrated agent-causal view’’ in Clarke (2003), O’Connor (2000), Mele
(2002) in Robert Kane (Ed.).
6 Although Mele has used the term ‘‘unconscious’’, I would prefer the term ‘‘preconscious’’.
Preconscious mental states can be causally productive, given they happen to be selected by the agent
to help in conscious intention formation. In this sense, preconscious mental states and processes may be
looked upon as the precursor of their conscious counterparts. What makes a preconscious state say, my
implicit belief that choosing First-order Predicate Logic module over Social Political Philosophy module
as an optional paper at the Masters level would help me in job interviews a species of the unconscious is
its inaccessibility to conscious awareness at times. But what sets it apart from some neurochemical
processes going on within an organism that merit the description of pure unconscious is its intrinsic
capacity to be transformed into a conscious state, via the agent’s executive control. See Searle (2004,
p. 167) for a similar view on the preconscious.
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substance that is capable of functioning absolutely independent of any internal
interference (read mental states), they can successfully keep freedom of agency
separate from determinism. This way of explaining the ontology of agency, however,
comes at the cost of pushing mental causation out of the picture. Granted that there is
an autonomous agent which is the referent of the ‘I’, which these libertarians would
admit of as a self—a mind independent entity—it cannot be denied that this self can
only exercise free will through the intermediary of its psychological states. Mele’s
event-causal libertarian view discussed above provides an intelligible libertarian
account of how agential freedom is sustained even when micro-level indeterministic
processes are under way. Robert Kane andHelen Steward are among other libertarians
who have explained the ontology of agency in terms of local-level indeterminism
between the agent and the agent-involving goal-directed states. Helen Steward is
among other libertarians who have made local-level indeterminism a desideratum in
explaining agential control in decision-making. She develops a view of intentional
agency that centres on the concept of ‘‘settling a matter through the manoeuvre of
body’’, ubiquitous even in non-human species, which can be accounted for only on an
assumption of what she calls a ‘‘two-way power’’:
A one-way power can be the power to cause a certain outcome, but cannot
constitute the power to settle whether that outcome or some other, obtains,
because the causing of that very outcome will be already settled by the time the
power is exercised… It is natural, I think, to suppose that we humans are settlers
of certain things—but no less natural, I would maintain, to suppose that many
other animals are, too. The controlled trajectories through the world which
constitute their voluntarymovements are settled,… at the time of action, and not
before, and they are settled… through their actions, as they act. (Steward 2009)
Robert Kane argues that it is ‘‘self-forming actions’’ (SFA-s) or ‘‘will-setting
actions’’ (Kane 2007) where free will is exhibited par excellence. An SFA typically
involves a conflict between equally inviting choices that an agent has equally
rational reasons to pursue. As an example of this sort of actions, Kane refers to the
dilemma a businesswoman faces when she has to opt between heading for a crucial
business meet which would professionally benefit her and saving the victim of a
road accident she has been witness to on her way to the meeting. When an agent is
faced with such conflicts, the final choice, Kane argues, happens to be a function of
micro-indeterministic activities in the brain caused by uncertainties in the mind
about which of the decisions would obtain greater good. This kind of indeterminacy
is non-random as it provides the agent with what Kane calls ‘‘plural voluntary
control’’ while consciously weighing the options, a concept similar to Steward’s
‘‘two-way power’’.
Not all libertarians, however, would agree with Kane in arguing that indeter-
minism always has to be at play prior to clinching the decision, in order for making
the action ‘‘appropriately non-random’’, probabilistic and therefore free (Balaguer
Rational deliberation  Evaluative judgment Decision to do A Intentionally doing A 
Fig. 2 The role of local-level indeterminism in Mele’s scheme of decision-making
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2010). Mark Balaguer contrasts Kane’s SFA-s with what he calls torn decisions in
which case it is the subconscious assessment of reasons and not conscious weighing
of alternative choices that run underneath, and indeterminacies occur at the moment
of choice.7 This Balaguer says explains why we at times have the experience of
‘‘just choosing’’ after going through a dilemma. However, some philosophers do not
admit that such non-deliberatively indeterminist account of intention implementa-
tion can explain free will. As Daniel Dennett argues:
It is a familiar theme in discussion of free will that the important claim that
one could have done otherwise under the circumstances is not plausibly
construed as the claim that one could have done otherwise given exactly the
set of convictions and desires that prevailed at the end of rational deliberation.
So if there is to be a crucial undetermined nexus, it had better be prior to the
final assessment of the considerations on the stage…. (Dennett 1981)
In support of Dennett it may be said that the gap between the agent’s very own
‘‘recipes’’ for intention implementation and the actual implementation is not so
much evident in non-deliberative ‘‘local-level’’ indeterminacies as it is in explicitly
deliberative antecedent ‘‘local-level’’ indeterminacies. However, whether uncon-
scious mental causation should or should not count as a feature of intentional agency
is a debate that should form a separate discussion. To sum up, the framework
provided by the views discussed above only encourages us to take a compatibilist
stand following in the footsteps of David Hume. Insisting that there is a
‘‘conjunction between motives and voluntary actions… as regular and uniform as
that between the cause and effect’’ (Hume, 1748 [1999], p. 72), he argues that even
if we find a person intentionally acting in a manner not expected of her, we have to
infer that some ‘‘secret opposition of contrary causes’’ (ibid., p. 71) made way into
her deliberative processes leading her to opt for some*p instead of p and decide to
*A rather than A [vide corollary (1) on p. 10 of this work].
Now in the next section the aim would be to take up a few studies that throw light
on the nature of folk intuitions about the status of intentional agency even when it is
faced with the threat of determinism—neurochemical and psychological. However,
the actual benefit that can be extended to philosophical discourse on such
metaphysically laden issues through investigation into folk concepts and intuitions
would be discussed first to set the stage.
7 Ibid., p. 71.
Rational Deliberative Mode 
Conscious mode 
Unconscious 
mode 
beliefs, desires, hypotheses etc. (b1...bn , d1…dn , h1...hn, etc.) 
Fig. 3 The indeterministic coming-to-mind of nonoccurrent intentional states aiding evaluative
judgment
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Folk-Psychological Concepts: A Philosophical Reference Point
Paul M. Churchland famously decreed that folk-psychological concepts grounded in
beliefs, desires, etc. provide a ‘‘hopelessly primitive and deeply confused’’
(Churchland 1988) explanatory framework for how we behave the way we do
and should be abandoned, in the same way as ‘‘phlogiston’’, a mysterious substance
once thought to be behind the phenomena of burning and rusting has been
superseded by oxygen and wiped off the ontological picture of those phenomena.
Nevertheless, a new methodological surge in philosophy known as experimental
philosophy has reinforced the import of studying folk-psychological intuitions for
those who support this methodology argue that many of the intractable philosophical
puzzles such as those concerning the possibility of free will and moral responsibility
have their roots in pre-theoretical intuitions. Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, two
leading philosophers spearheading this experimental approach to philosophical
problems, argue that surveying folk concepts and intuitions aims to arm
philosophers with an insightful understanding about what underlying psychological
processes spawn those intuitions with the upshot of discovering whether those
psychological sources are in conflict with philosophically developed theories. If that
were the case, considering the fact that even philosophers undergo these
commonsense intuitions and may have been influenced by their own beliefs and
intuitions while developing a particular view, it could serve as an inkling to
philosophers who could then start revisiting and reformulating the philosophical
issues in question (Knobe and Nichols 2008, pp. 7–8).
In defence of the need to study folk concepts, philosopher Shaun Nichols (2004)
argues that analysis of folk concepts helps overcome the charge of single-subject
bias which occurs when philosophers try to defend their own intuitions through
conceptual analysis. Documenting the predominance of one intuition over another
may not help to solve the problem regarding the ontology of free will, but it will
certainly prod philosophers to do a rethinking of their enshrined philosophical
theories. Ernest Sosa, another advocate of the experimental philosophy, suggests
that the method carries the potential to challenge the background assumptions
forming our pre-reflective judgments about intentionality, free will, causation, etc.
(Sosa 2007; Vargas 2006).
Philosophers having affiliation to the experimental approach argue that it would
be unwise to sideline the folk concept of free will, not just because surveying it will
bring into prominence what we are inclined or disinclined to believe but will also
show how believing or not believing something has an effect on how we respond to
the ontological issues. Psychologist Bertram Malle makes an appeal to the study of
folk concepts in general:
Because of the strong influence of folk concepts on cognition and social life,
scholars who talk about things like intentionality, awareness, and choice must
make a fundamental decision: Are they going to talk about these things the
way ordinary people do…, or are they introducing technical terms? One would
hope that, if the latter, they would just use a new word, but that is not always
done. Ultimately, whenever a scientist describes a folk assumption and claims
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that some evidence shows it to be wrong, the scientist has to adhere to the folk
meaning of the relevant concepts, or else the evidence isn’t relevant (Malle
2006).
The Ontology of Rational Agency: A Folk-Psychological Survey
In ‘‘Agent-Grounded Indeterminacies or Agent-Involving-Event-Grounded Indeter-
minacies?’’ section an argument was developed with the upshot that causation by
both the agent and the agent-manoeuvred events (mental states and processes) needs
to be presupposed in order to preclude neurobiological determinism at the micro-
level from constraining the prospect of free will. In this section, I would present
three different strands of folk-psychological investigation with a hope to argue that
the folk intuitions laid bare in these studies, when considered in conjunction and not
in isolation, show that our subliminal beliefs are geared towards the idea of both a
controlling self and the causal sufficiency of the mental events as manoeuvred by
this self constituting the ontology of intentional agency.
Study 1
A study conducted by Nahmias (2006) and Nahmias et al. (2007) begins with the
assumption that it is the reductionistic, and by implication, a mechanistic
description of an intentional act and not neurobiological determinism that influences
folk intuitions about the possibility of free will. People might think that ‘‘our
deliberations and conscious purposes are bypassed by forces that are out of our
control’’ (Nahmias et al. 2007, p. 220). They accordingly assigned their subjects to
either of the two conditions—a real world condition and an alien world condition (in
order to diminish motivation to ascribe agency), portraying the ontology of
intentional action in both conditions in neuroscientific (mechanistic) and psycho-
logical (mentalistic) terms. The task set before the subjects was to select only that
condition which they thought was conducive to the occurrence of free actions.
Although Nahmias et al. presented each of the two groups of their subjects with two
scenarios: (a1) the real world where intentional behaviour has purely neurochemical
antecedents and (a2) the real world where intentional behaviour has purely
psychological antecedents; (b1) the alternate world where intentional behaviour has
purely neurochemical antecedents and (b2) the alternate world where intentional
behaviour has purely psychological antecedents, I have reformulated the scenario
for the sake of brevity outlining the real world condition in the main while keeping
the alternate world condition within parentheses. The psychological deterministic
description of agency which is placed in both real world and alternate world
conditions has also been kept within parentheses. The subjects were presented with
the following test condition:
In our own world [in an earth-like planet called Erta where the inhabitants behave
almost in a human-like manner] neuroscientific research [and psychological
research] has made the discovery that decisions made by humans [by the Ertans]
are fully caused by neurochemical processes and reactions in the brain [and
psychological processes like thoughts, desires and plans in the mind], which are
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again fully caused by the agents’ genetic makeup and physical environment [genetic
makeup and upbringing]. Gap reduced the upshot of this discovery is, whenever
certain neurochemical processes and reactions in the brain or (thoughts, desires and
plans in the mind) occur, they will certainly cause the humans or [Ertans] to make a
certain decision.
The subjects (1124 undergraduate students with subjects other than philosophy as
their major disciplines) were then asked questions related to free will and rate their
agreement on a scale from 1 to 6, where rating the response with the lowest mark on
the scale indicates strong disagreement and with the highest mark, strong
agreement. Tables 2 and 3 show the percentage of subjects responding to the
questions with strong agreement (if not stated otherwise).
The folk preference of psychological determinism to neurodeterminism espe-
cially in the real world scenario seemingly evinces belief in an agent in control of
the psychological processes (see items 1, 3 and 4 in Table 2 and items 1 and 3 in
Table 3). It is most striking that subjects who responded to the alternate world
scenario still insisted on the presence of a soul irrespective of the physicalistic or
mentalistic descriptions of the ontology of intentional actions. However, note should
be taken of the fact that there was more disagreement than agreement across both
neuroreductionistic and psychological descriptions about the soul being the only
factor involved in making the decisions (indicated by item 5 in Table 2). If this
result is viewed in conjunction with the finding that a high percentage of nods were
given to the psychological deterministic description of behaviour (item 2 on the
extreme right in both Tables 2 and 3) even in the alien world scenario where the
motivation for ascribing agency was comparatively lessened, the folk belief in
mental events like thoughts and desires as providing inputs in the causal nexus is
evinced as well. The folk intuition about the ontology of agency then certainly
appears to conform to the agent-executed-event-causal view—the philosophically
intuitive view developed in the previous section. However, since Nahmias et al.
made a dichotomy between the neurophysiological and the mental, it was left to be
known that, if mental states were presented as neural states following the
neuroscientific sense of the mental, whether people would still take it as a threat to
free will and hold on to their mechanistic-incompatibilist position. Another study, to
Table 2 Different intuitions about intentional behaviour in real world. Adapted from Nahmias et al.
(2007)
Possibilities in a
neurodeterministic set-up
Possibilities in a psychological–
deterministic set-up
1. Decisions ‘‘up to’’ agent 34.3 85.9
2. Free will 38.3 82.9
3. Control 38.8 80.3
4. Humans having non-physical souls 63.0 63.4
5. Free will only because of soul 33.3 (strong disagreement)
24.7
46.5 (strong disagreement)
16.9
J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. (2017) 34:129–149 141
123
Author's personal copy
be discussed in the next subsection, that tried to delve into the folk belief about what
it is like to act out of free will addresses this issue.
Study 2
In the study conducted by Monroe and Malle (2010) folk intuitions did not show any
indication that free will is diminished by the truth of neuroreductionism or what
Nahmias termed ‘‘mechanistic incompatibilism’’. The investigators in this study
asked their subjects to consider the scenario stated below and give their reasoned
opinion:
Neuroscientific research has good evidence to establish that all behaviour is
caused by neural impulses. This implies that the phenomenology of controlling
behaviour is an illusion. Do you agree with this position?
The Result (See Also Table 4 for Detailed Responses)
Out of 175 subjects, 85 categorically rejected the idea that neuroscientific
revelations about the causal structure of intentional action renders free will an
illusion. Of the remaining 90 subjects, 44 neither fully rejected the illusion claim
nor fully accepted it. Focus was immediately shifted to the reasoning offered by
these 129 respondents for rejecting or not fully accepting the illusion claim to look
out for any sign of compatibilist belief. Of the 129 again 94 provided responses. The
counterarguments were found to have predominantly a compatibilist undertone with
somewhat reserved reasoning offered by 24% of the 94 respondents, although not
amounting to hardcore incompatibilism. However, even most of these 24%
respondents must have upheld the choice-making ability, as 86 out of the 94 who
actually provided responses gave one response and 8 gave two responses, and if
55% choose the first response category of Table 4, then there remain very few who
did not choose the choice-making ability. What is notably different from Nahmias’s
result is, many subjects of this study preserved their belief in free will without
disallowing the neurobiological causation and even when they put the mental
causation before the neural causation they never really shoved off the neurobio-
logical description of free will.
Table 3 Different intuitions about intentional behaviour in alien world. Adapted from Nahmias et al.
(2007)
Possibilities in a
neurodeterministic set-up
Possibilities in a psychological–
deterministic set-up
1. Decisions ‘‘up to’’ agent 40.4 56.3
2. Free will 39.1 53.1
3. Humans having non-
physical souls
74.4 70.8
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If a comparison is made between these two studies, a complex character of folk
concept of agency and free will appears to be unravelled. It is only because of the
different styling of the study questions that only two different aspects of the nature
of folk concept of free will (see Table 5) come out which need not be viewed in
contrast from one another. While Nahmias’s study was designed to test whether the
threat of mechanistic causation of intentional action is overridden by the threat of
deterministic causation of intentional action, it accordingly pitted psychological
causation against causation induced by brain events.
And people quite expectedly chose psychological causation as the plausible
ontological explanation. Unlike in Nahmias’s study, Monroe and Malle’s study did
not try to influence folk intuition in any way with the result that the subjects in the
latter’s study chose to put the decision-making capacity of the agent above the
‘‘neural impulses’’. A hint of event-causal belief was also found when subjects
supported their predominantly agent-causal view with arguments like ‘‘neural
impulses are themselves caused by something in the mind’’ or ‘‘neural impulses
alone do not cause behaviour’’ (see Table 4).
Table 4 Folk intuitions about neurobiological determinism being deterrent or determinant of decision
making (adapted from Monroe and Malle 2010)
Response category Percentage of
subjects
responding
Concrete response statements
Choice-making ability 55 ‘‘All people have the free will and choice to
decide what they want in their life’’; ‘‘You
choose what to do—your neurons don’t just
fire at will’’; ‘‘Even though you have neural
impulses, your free will allows you to look
over those impulses and decide for yourself’’
Neural impulses are not the only
component in the causal
antecedents of behaviour
24 Subjects reasoned that moral action, impulse
control, etc. are not fully causally explained
by neural impulses and sought to include
social influence and feelings in the causal
structure
Neural impulses are caused by the
mental
14 ‘‘Neural impulses all have to begin
somewhere’’; ‘‘Neural impulses are caused
due to our free will’’
Table 5 A comparison of the dominant folk beliefs about processes aiding decision making: Nahmias’s
study vs. Monroe and Malle’s study
Types of notions about free will Nahmias’
study
Monroe and Malle’s
study
Event causal Explicit Implicit
Agent causal (may not rest on a notion of uncaused cause) Implicit Explicit
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Study 3a, 3(b1, b2) and 3c
Malle and Knobe (1997) embarked upon a comprehensive analysis (study 3a) of
folk concept of intentional causation of behaviour, in which folk psychology was
revealed to embrace a model that comprised of a web of agent-manoeuvred events,
viz. beliefs, desire, intention, skill and awareness. Although Malle and Knobe did
not intend to interpret the outcome of the study as an illustration of libertarian
belief, either agent-causal or event-causal, I suggest a deeper analysis would reveal
why folk intuitions led the subjects of this study to indicate that belief–desire and
well-formed intuition ensuing from the belief–desire were an imperative for
intentional causation of behaviour. For example, when asked to respond to the
question: ‘‘What it is like to act intentionally?’’, the study found subjects offering
descriptions like ‘‘The person meant to act that way and was motivated to do so’’
and ‘‘Someone gave thought to the action beforehand and chose to do it’’ (see also
Malle 2006, pp. 216–217). Malle and Knobe suggested that an entrenched belief in
intention and desire (as the first response shows) and/or belief along with desire (as
indicated by the second response) pervaded folk concept concerning the causal
prerequisites of intentional behaviour. Such descriptions show that pre-theoretical
intuitions about intentionality are not averse to the idea of event-causation.
Responses like the ones stated are an indication that folk psychology puts belief–
desire–intention in the causal series leading to the intentional action in a hierarchical
way. The support for agent causation also appears to emerge, as evidenced by the
subjects’ emphasis on the role of awareness and skill.8 The subjects may have
tended to enlist awareness and skill not because they think they add to the causal
repertoire of the agent, but necessarily add to the selfhood of the agent, helping her
implement the action through the belief–desire–intention event triad. Malle and
Knobe also agree on this when they acknowledge, ‘‘Performing an intentional action
… requires at least minimal conscious awareness’’ (p. 108). Similarly, skill or
adeptness in executing an intended action may have been deemed by the subjects as
enhancing the causal power of the agent. Malle and Knobe also concur that ‘‘…
people only consider an action intentional if there is evidence of the actor’s skill’’
(p. 109). In support of their claim they presented their subjects with a scenario in
which the protagonist, John (a) has either mastered the skill of flipping a coin and
making it land on the side he wants (or is still an amateur at it), (b) has (or has not) a
desire to go to a movie and (c) has (or has not) a belief that by making the coin land
on its tail he would be able to decide whether to catch the movie. The coin finally
lands on its tail. The subjects were then asked to respond with Yes/No to the
following questions (p. 110):
1. Did John try to make the coin land on its tail?
2. Did John intentionally make the coin land on its tail?
8 Responses citing awareness as an ingredient of the ontology of intentional behaviour took some such
forms: ‘‘This person thought about the action before he did it and was fully aware of performing the
action while he was doing it’’ (Malle and Knobe 1997).
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The difference between responses to question reducegap1 and 2 was, while most
subjects believed that even in the presence of only desire or only belief as
reducegap a precondition, John could have tried to do the tail-landing act with the
coin, under no circumstances, could he do the same intentionally with only-belief or
only-desire precondition. Even the desire–belief condition was not deemed sufficient
(see Table 3 of Malle and Knobe 1997, p. 110); it was thought that he must have
had mastered the skill before he could intentionally do that act fuelled by his desire
and belief. Skill, like awareness, is then highly likely to be a fixture in the folk
concept concerning the ontology of intentional behaviour insofar as it is seen as
constituting the selfhood of the agent engaged in implementing a goal or intention.
Knobe and Nichols (2011) conducted a series of studies (3b1, 3b2) the
outcome of which according to them indicated a dominant belief in what they
referred to as an ‘‘executive conception of self’’ as opposed to the ‘‘bodily
conception of self’’9 and the ‘‘psychological conception of self’’10 bolstering
their hunch that ‘‘people will continue to have the sense that if everything is
controlled by these [physical and psychological11] states and processes,
somehow they themselves cannot be fully free or responsible’’ (p. 531). On
the executive conception of the self, the mental phenomena, although very much
a part of the aetiology of intentional behaviour, have a higher-level controller
that ‘‘consider these states and arrive at a decision’’ (p. 539). In order to test
their hypothesis, Knobe and Nichols (study 3b1) randomly presented the subjects
with either of the two conditions—one trying to explain a bodily action in terms
of a cause that requires effort and another, and the other in terms of mechanistic
causes. The first condition upheld ‘‘choice cause’’, while the second ‘‘emotion
cause’’. The subjects were then asked to put on record their degree of agreement
regarding the agent’s causing that behaviour using a scale from 1 to 7, 7
indicating strongest agreement and 1 strongest disagreement.
Choice-cause condition John’s eye blinked as he wanted to draw attention of a
friend.
Emotion-cause condition John’s eye blinked as he was startled and upset.
The question John caused his eye to blink. When is it true? (a) when John’s mental
states cause that act? or (b) when John’s emotions cause that act?
Number of participants ¼ 30
Mean rating for emotion-cause ¼ 2:6=7 disagreementð Þ
Mean rating for choice-cause ¼ 5:5=7 agreementð Þ:
9 The classical example of the bodily conception of the self has been sketched by Thomas Huxley when
he declared that the ‘‘soul stands related to the body as the bell of a clock to the works’’ (Huxley 1874
[2002], p. 29).
10 The psychological notion of self emerged in the writings of David Hume, notably when he attributed
the freedom to act to the ‘‘power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will’’
(Hume 1748 [1999], p. 77).
11 The bracketed parts indicate my emphasis.
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Explanation
Knobe and Nichols tried to account for this difference in responses in the two
conditions by appealing to a hardwired conception of self adopted by the subjects—
the executive conception of self, one in which the agenthood is not perceived as
reducible to the relevant psychological states. This view was readily taken by the
subjects when they were provided with the choice-cause condition, as the purposive
act of John (‘‘trying to draw attention’’ served as the cue) induced them to approach
the question of agency from what Knobe and Nichols labelled as a ‘‘zoomed-in’’
perspective—one in which the self is viewed as executing the pertinent mental
states and processes for implementing intention. When confronted with the emotion-
cause condition however, adoption of this ‘‘zoomed-in’’ perspective led them to
believe that John’s eye-blinking act was merely a mechanistic offshoot of his mental
states. The perception of the absence of agential control then was the cause for the
denial of agency in the emotion-cause condition.
That folk has a strong belief in an executive-like self was reiterated in the next
study as well (3b2). In anticipation of an objection to the previous study that the high
degree of disagreement recorded in emotion-cause condition was due to the fact that
emotional states like ‘‘being startled or upset’’ were not considered by the subjects
as agent-involving mental states like the agent’s desires, reasons, etc. relevant for
doing something intentionally, the latter being considered by the agent essential for
making an evaluative judgment, Knobe and Nichols formulated a test condition that
depicted behaviour in terms of an agent’s thoughts. All subjects were presented with
the following condition and asked to select any one of the statements that followed.
The Condition
John’s hand trembled as he thought about asking his boss for a promotion.
Statement 1 John caused his hand to tremble
Statement 2 John’s thoughts caused his hand to tremble
Number of participants ¼ 41
Mean rating for self-cause ¼ 3:76=7 disagreementð Þ
Mean rating for mental-cause ¼ 5:8=7 agreementð Þ:
Explanation
Here more subjects agreed than disagreed that it was John’s thoughts that caused his
hand to tremble. The result could be interpreted from two different angles. First,
subjects very likely adopted a psychological, a zoomed out concept of self, one in
which mental events like thoughts constitute selfhood that allow them to approve of
John’s thoughts playing a causal role. Knobe and Nichols chose this interpretation.
On a second interpretation, I suggest that the folk belief in the agent-executed-
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event-causal libertarianism once again comes to the forefront. Trembling of hands
when we dread doing something surely is viewed as a specimen of behaviour over
which one has little control. In all likelihood therefore the subjects found the
thought-cause (mental event cause) scenario more intuitively appealing because
they must have determined that the self in this case played no role over executing
the psychological states that resulted in the involuntary action.
In yet another study (3c) carried out by Knobe and Nichols (2011), the untutored
intuition extracted from subjects evinced that a sharp line is drawn between the
actions performed by an automaton and a human in terms of the nature of the
underlying causal processes that can be manoeuvered and modified by some higher-
level entity. Asked whether a computer with a robotic hand can override its
programming codes to move its hand to the right so as to be able to push a button
and prevent the administration of an electric shock to a laboratory rat, even as the
computer is fed with the specific instruction to administer the shock, most subjects
tended to give a negative response. In a sharp contrast, the same subjects expressed
the conviction that a human in a similar setting could override his desires, urges and
thoughts, both conscious and unconscious, to push the button and stop the electric
shock, even though he was instructed to do exactly the opposite. This again
indicates that ordinary intuition supports the notion of self that forms intentions and
controls decisions, overriding but not abolishing the mental causes.
Conclusion
The primary claim of the agent-executed-event-causal libertarianism as laid out in
this work was, the local-level processes preceding a decision or the implementation
of a goal embedded in the decision could not but be micro-indeterministic. These
processes involving mental events like beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. involved in
turn a higher-level controller that made it impossible for the processes to end up in
only one direction regardless of, however, much deliberation occurred prior to the
settlement of a decision. That is, these processes as manoeuvered by the self left it
non-randomly undetermined which of the set of mental events would be found by
the self worth considering and finally contributing to the agent-specific ‘‘recipe’’ for
intention implementation, leaving open the possibility for alternate action. This was
the thrust of the argument set forth by libertarian philosophers like Kane, Mele and
Steward. The claim also received a boost from the folk-psychological intuitions as
examined in ‘‘Folk-Psychological Concepts: A Philosophical Reference Point’’
section. Thus the apparent threat thought to be posed by determinism at the
neurobiological or psychological was nullified. However, there is an important way
in which the indeterministic determination by the self at the ‘‘local level’’ is
intimately connected to the self-determinism at the ‘‘global level’’. If we assess a
person’s decisions and goals from a global panoramic perspective, then we would
perhaps be more inclined to say that the person could not have acted otherwise,
because she already has self-determined her nature of purposive activities through
‘‘the stored memories of a lifetime, value systems, both innate and acquired, plus all
the various mental powers of cognition, reasoning, intuition, etc.’’ (Sperry 1980,
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p. 200). What the self would choose at this or the next moment may remain
unbeknownst to an external observer, but as she chooses from the repertory of her
self-determined mental events, the choices remain in metaphysical consonance with
what she determined herself to become. To quote Hobart (1934 [1969]) in this
connection:
To say that they (the acts)12 come from the self is to say that they are
determined by the self—the moral self, the self with a moral quality…. When
he (the indeterminist) maintains that the self at the moment of decision may
act to some extent independently of motives, and is good or bad according as
it acts in this direction or that, he is simply setting up one character within
another, he is separating the self from what he understands by the persons’
character.
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